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Abstract 
This study investigates the impacts of rising wages and the appreciation of the 
yuan on the structure of China’s exports. China’s exports are classified here as 
ordinary exports (OE) and two distinctive groups of processing exports, pure 
assembly exports (PAE) and mixed assembly exports (MAE). The data analyzed 
here are derived from panel data covering China’s bilateral PAE and MAE trade 
with more than 100 trading partners from 1993 to 2013. Estimates of fixed effect 
models show that wage increases and the appreciation of the yuan reduced the 
proportion of assembly exports in China’s bilateral exports. Specifically, for a 1% 
increase in Chinese manufacturing wages, the share of PAE in China’s bilateral 
exports is expected to fall 1.6 percentage points and that of MAE to decrease by 
1.1 percentage points; a 1% nominal appreciation of the yuan against the US 
dollar would be expected to lower PAE and MAE trade volume by 2.4 and 2.1 
percentage points, respectively. The empirical results imply that rising wages and 
cumulative appreciation of the yuan have eroded China’s comparative advantage 
in the assembly of products for international markets, resulting in substantial 
contraction of processing exports. The analysis provides a supply-side 
explanation for the fall of China’s export growth.   
Key Words:  China, Wage, Exchange Rates, processing trade 
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1. Introduction 
Exports have for some time been one of the critical engines driving the rapid 
growth of the Chinese economy. It is estimated that, on average, exports 
accounted for one third of China’s annual GDP growth between 2002 and 2007 
(Xing and Manisha, 2013). The massive expansion of exports in recent decades 
has transformed China into the largest exporting nation in the world.  After the 
global financial crisis of 2008, however, the engine of exports lost steam and the 
growth of exports plummeted to -2.8% in 2015 from 20% five years earlier. This 
suggests that the era of double-digit growth is over.  
To a certain extent, weakened demand in the US, Japan and the European Union, 
major destinations for China’s exports, substantially undermined growth 
momentum. The slowing of growth might also have been a result of the 
government’s so-called “rebalancing strategy,” involving a shift from export-
oriented to domestic consumption-oriented growth. The scale of exports, more 
than $2 trillion annually, could also have reduced the pace of export expansion. 
On the other hand, the deceleration of exports indicates that the impact of supply 
factors such as yuan appreciation and persistent wage increases is worthy of 
investigation.  
Since July 2005 the yuan value of the US dollar has decreased from 8.3 to 6.3, a 
35% nominal appreciation of the yuan.  Given the disparity between inflation 
rates in the US and China, the real appreciation of the yuan could be even higher.  
Moreover, wages in China have risen steadily in recent years. The average 
annual wage of Chinese workers has risen more than 13% every year since 2000 
and surged to 54,000 yuan (around US$ 8,000) in 2014. If the growth of Chinese 
worker productivity failed to compensate for the increase in production costs due 
to cumulative wage increases and currency appreciation, profit margins and 
export competitiveness would be undermined, hurting the growth of exports.  
Processing exports, accounting for a large share of China’s exports, are heavily 
dependent on the input of cheap labor and have a razor-thin profit margin. Wage 
increases and the appreciation of the yuan have clearly eroded the profit margins 
of processing exports, thus constraining the expansion of processing exports and 
even driving some firms specializing in processing exports to exit or relocate to 
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third countries. The widespread bankruptcies of manufacturing firms in Dong 
Guan, a Chinese city near Hong Kong where many firms engaging in assembly 
exports have clustered, is a typical example. Some foreign companies which had 
been using China as an export platform began to relocate their production 
facilities to the home country or to third countries. Results of a JETRO survey 
reveal that 13.5% of Japanese affiliated electronic machinery firms planned to 
either downsize operations in China or retreat altogether (JETRO, 2014). The exit 
of both domestic and foreign firms from processing exports unambiguously 
undercut China’s export capacity, leading to the deceleration of export expansion. 
The proportion of processing exports in China’s total exports dropped to 39% in 
2013 from a peak of 55% in 2004, a significant contraction of processing exports, 
which had powered the double-digit export growth following China’s official entry 
into the WTO.  
The impact of wage increases and currency appreciation on exports is a classic 
research topic. Numerous studies have investigated the effect of exchange rates 
on China’s exports, concentrating mainly on estimating the exchange rate 
elasticity of exports. Gacia-Herrero and Koivu (2009) used a co-integration 
technique to estimate the long-run elasticities of China’s processing exports and 
imports to real exchange rates. Chung, Chinn and Fujii (2009) analyzed a similar 
issue over the relatively long period from 1980 to 2006. Azizi and Li (2007) 
emphasized dynamic changes in export elasticity. Thorbecke and Smith (2010) 
simulated the impact of joint appreciation of the currencies of all East Asian 
economies on China’s processing exports. Xing (2012) argued that the 
processing imports of China represent external demand and should fall, not 
increase, as the yuan appreciates, and demonstrated how processing imports 
would decrease 5.0% for a 10% real appreciation of the yuan against the US 
dollar.  
All of the studies mentioned above implicitly assume that the underlying impact of 
the yuan’s appreciation is experienced through price mechanisms. In other words, 
when the yuan appreciates against foreign currencies, the prices of Chinese 
exports are expected to rise. This increase in prices reduces the demand by 
foreign consumers and thus causes a fall of exports. However, about 80% of 
Chinese exports are invoiced in the US dollar, so there is no automatic exchange 
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rate pass-through mechanism for these exports. In other words, without raising 
dollar-denominated prices, Chinese exporters simply cannot pass the cost of the 
yuan’s appreciation on to foreign buyers. In addition, most Chinese exporters, in 
particular those specializing in processing exports, have no pricing power. It is 
highly unlikely that Chinese manufacturers of processing exports would be able 
to renegotiate processing fees and pass the cost of currency appreciation on to 
foreign buyers or contractors.  
To cope with wage increases and currency appreciation, firms usually adjust their 
operating strategies. Domestic firms may opt to exit the assembly business; 
multinational companies using China as an export platform may relocate 
production capacity to third countries; and foreign companies may outsource 
labor-intensive tasks to countries where wages are lower than in China. These 
adjustments not only reduce export capacity but also give rise to changes in 
export structure. Nevertheless, the impacts of such operational adjustments on 
export structure are irrelevant to, and cannot be captured by, exchange rate 
elasticity. Estimations of elasticity cannot determine to what extent wage 
increases and currency appreciation have affected export structure, nor can they 
measure the consequences of firms’ exit from the processing export sector. 
This paper investigates the impact of currency appreciation and wage increases 
on the structure rather than the volume of China’s exports.  Export structure is 
defined here in terms of production methods, not commodity categories. 
Specifically, we divide exports into ordinary exports (OE), pure assembly exports 
(PAE) and mixed assembly exports (MAE). OE refers to exports which generally 
do not involve imported parts and components, and whose value added is 100% 
domestically produced; PAE refers to processing exports created with supplied 
materials as defined by Chinese Customs; and MAE are processing exports 
created with imported materials. The sum of PAE and MAE is equal to the total 
processing exports reported in China’s foreign trade statistics. The paper reports 
the analysis of data on China’s bilateral assembly exports with more than 100 
trading partners during the period 1993-2013. This is the first study to investigate 
the impact of wages and exchange rates on China’s export structure, defined in 
terms of production methods. 
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2. Processing exports and the evolution of China’s export structure  
Processing exports have been a major export modality in China, contributing 
significantly to overall growth, e.g., from $73.7 billion to $860 billion between 
1995 and 2013. During the high-growth period 1995-2007, processing exports 
accounted for more than 50% of China’s total exports. At the peak, the share was 
57% (see figure 1). It is estimated that more than 80% of China’s high-tech 
exports are processing exports, which makes China the top high-tech exporting 
nation in the world (Xing, 2014).  
Assembling parts and components into finished products is a necessary but low 
value added segment of global value chains (GVCs). Aside from China’s 
comparative advantage in labor endowment, the rapid expansion of China’s 
processing exports is mainly attributed to Chinese firms’ active participation in 
value chains of global manufacturing. Since 1990, the influx of foreign direct 
investment and the outsourcing activities of multinational enterprises have 
integrated Chinese firms into GVCs and transformed China into the global center 
for assembly of manufactured products. GVCs have functioned as a vehicle for 
the entry of China’s processing exports into international markets. All processing 
exports are distributed via networks established by the lead firms of value chains, 
which greatly enhances market access for China’s exports. In addition, 
processing exports usually bear internationally recognized brands owned by 
multinational enterprises and preferred by foreign consumers, in particular 
consumers in developed countries. To a large extent, the spillover effects of 
GVCs in terms of brands, technology innovations and distribution networks have 
strengthened the international competitiveness of China’s processing exports and 
greatly facilitated China’s global expansion (Xing, 2016).  
The dominance of processing exports began to decline in 2006, one year after 
China reformed its exchange rate regime and let the yuan appreciate. The share 
of processing exports dropped below 50% for the first time in 2008 and continued 
to fall, reaching 39% in 2013. While both PAE and MAE experienced decreased 
shares of total exports, PAE contracted more in both relative and absolute terms. 
The growth of PAE turned negative in 2008.  By 2013 the yearly volume of PAE 
had decreased to US$92.5 billion, about 20% less than the peak of $116 billion, 
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and the share of PAE in total exports shrank to a mere 4.2%. This significant 
contraction of PAE suggests that many firms had exited the pure assembly sector. 
PAE is more vulnerable than OE and MAE to wage increases and the 
appreciation of the yuan. PAE products are made exclusively with imported parts 
and components and require only low skilled labor services from Chinese firms. 
PAE processing fees, which are invoiced in the US dollar, are the only source of 
revenue for those firms.  Wage increases and the appreciation of the yuan 
automatically squeeze PAE profit margins, resulting in an exodus of both 
domestic and foreign firms from pure assembly exports, the lowest value added 
segment of GVCs.   
Figure 1. The Structure of China’s Exports, by Production Type 
 
Source: the author’s calculation based on data from China Customs Office. 
The scale of MAE is much larger than that of PAE. In recent years, MAE has 
accounted for 70 to 90% of processing exports, in 2013 approximately $768 
billion, about 34% of China’s total exports. MAE volume has experienced a long 
period of continuous growth, but the pace of that growth has slowed considerably 
in recent years. For instance, in 2012 and 2013, MAE grew only 5% and 0.6%, 
respectively, and the total exports share of MAE dropped steadily from a peak of 
43.7% in 2004. The decrease in MAE growth cannot be attributed to weakened 
external demand alone, because in the same years, ordinary exports grew by 
11.6% and 13.7%, respectively.  
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In general, processing exports have several advantages over ordinary exports in 
international markets. They are distributed by global retail networks of 
multinational companies and sold under globally recognized brands. If weakened 
external demand results in slowed growth, ordinary exports can be expected to 
suffer more than MAE. Therefore, factors affecting MAE supply capacity, such as 
wages and exchange rates, should be taken into consideration in analysis of the 
decline of MAE and of processing exports as a whole.  
MAE are typically manufactured using both imported and domestically made 
parts and components. MAE manufacturers have more leverage than PAE 
manufacturers to absorb the burden of wage increases and currency appreciation. 
They may be able to pass the burden on to domestic suppliers, or replace 
expensive foreign-made parts with cheaper domestic ones. Therefore, despite 
significant wage increases and the appreciation of the yuan, MAE still accounts 
for about one third of China’s total exports.  
Figure 2. The Share of Processing Exports in China’s Bilateral 
Exports (%)
 
Source: the author’s calculation. 
The downward trend of processing exports can also be observed in China’s 
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trends in processing exports from China to the US, Japan and Germany. From 
1995-1999, about 70% of China’s exports to the US were processing exports; 
from 2000-2009, processing exports remained dominant but their share of total 
exports decreased to 60%. By 2013, the share of processing exports had shrunk 
to 51%. In the case of China’s exports to Japan, processing exports accounted 
for 52% in 1995, gradually rose to 59.2% in 2004, and then decreased to 50.6% 
in 2013. Germany has for some time been the largest European destination for 
China’s processing exports. Processing exports accounted for 51.2% of China’s 
exports to Germany in 1995, reached a peak of 64.8% in 2004, and then fell 
gradually to 38.6% in 2013.  
3. Wages, currency appreciation and the exit of firms from assembly 
exports 
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical explanation for the effect of wages 
and exchange rates on the operational strategies of firms specializing in 
processing exports. Assume that there are two firms, one domestic and one 
foreign, involved in processing exports. The domestic firm, assembling imported 
parts to produce finished products for export, has reservation markup ∝ per unit 
of assembled exports. If the gross per unit profit margin of assembled exports is 
less than the markup, i.e. pe− 𝑤! <∝ , where 𝑤!  denotes the Chinese yuan 
wage for the labor required to produce one unit of assembled exports; p 
represents the unit assembly fee in US dollars; and e is the nominal exchange 
rate (the price of the dollar in terms of the yuan), then the firm will exit the 
assembly business. For a given assembly fee p, an increase in wc or a decrease 
in e (yuan appreciation) reduces the profit margin   pe− 𝑤! . The profit margin will 
continue to decrease as wages rise and/or the yuan appreciates. Eventually the 
tipping point pe− 𝑤! =∝ is reached and the domestic firm exits the assembly 
business. Before the profit margin falls to the level of the reservation markup ∝, it 
is highly likely that the firm will stop expanding its assembly business, thus 
reducing the growth of processing exports and giving rise to changes in the 
composition of exports.  
A foreign firm assembling exports has the option of conducting that business in 
another country, so it follows a different exit decision rule: if  !!!  - Chinese workers’ 
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wages in US dollars is higher than wages w! in alternative foreign country j, i.e. if 𝑤!/e > w!, the foreign firm will leave China and outsource its assembly work 
(relocate assembly capacity) to country j. An increase in 𝑤! or a decrease in e 
raises Chinese workers’ dollar equivalent wages. Once China’s wages exceed 
those of country j, the foreign firm exits the assembly of exports in China and 
relocates its production facility to country j. As China’s labor cost advantage 
diminishes, because of either wage increases or the appreciation of the yuan or 
both, the foreign firm will eventually stop investing in new production facilities. 
This analysis implies that wage increases and local currency appreciation are 
inversely related to the profit margins of processing exports. If wage increases 
and local currency appreciation persist, they will eventually drive assembly firms 
to exit the business or relocate to other countries.   
Figure 3. Monthly Salaries of Employees in Japanese Affiliates in Selected Asian 
Cities (US$)  
 
Source: JETRO (2015) 
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According to a 2015 JETRO survey on investment costs of Japanese affiliated 
firms in Asia, the average monthly salary of workers in Japanese affiliated 
companies in Beijing was $564, the highest among the eight Chinese cities 
surveyed; that in Dalian the lowest, at $392. However, Dalian’s salary was 7.8% 
higher than that in Bangkok, 49% higher than in Jakarta, 51% higher than in 
564	  
472	   460	   413	   392	   431	   398	   425	   400	   466	   453	  
263	   267	  
369	  
185	   127	   113	   112	  
918	   944	  
783	  
654	   631	   653	   602	  
727	   736	  
856	  
1000	  
425	   386	  
681	  
351	   388	   323	  
174	  
workers	   Engineers	  
10	  
	  
Manila and 115% higher than in Ho Chi Minh City. Local engineers hired by 
Japanese companies in Shanghai received an average monthly salary of $944, 
the highest among the Chinese cities surveyed, while the average monthly salary 
of local engineers hired by Japanese companies in Qingdao was $602, the 
lowest in the group. On the other hand, the average engineer’s salary in Qingdao 
was 43% higher than that in Jakarta, 56% higher than in Manila and 71% higher 
than in Ho Chi Minh City (figure 3).  
Figure 4. The Distribution of Japanese FDI in Asia 
 
Source: JETRO 
The results of the survey indicate that, compared with South East Asian countries, 
which have recently emerged as the top Asian destination for Japanese FDI, in 
terms of labor costs China has lost its competitiveness in attracting Japanese 
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announced that it would move 50% of its air purifier production from China back 
to Japan (Kyodo News, 2015). Citizen Holdings, a well-known Japanese watch 
maker, closed its watch parts factory in Guanzhou in February 2015 (Nikkei, 
2015).  To cope with rising labor costs, Foxconn, which exports about $80 billion 
in information communication technology products from China annually (Sun and 
Grimes, 2015), recently announced a plan to invest $5 billion on the construction 
of an assembly factory in India.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
In our empirical analysis of the impacts of wage increases and currency 
appreciation on the structure of China’s exports, we used the standard gravity 
model, defining China’s exports to country  as  
    (1) 
and China’s processing exports to country  as 
  (2)  
where denotes China’s GDP, the GDP of country , and the 
distance between China and country .  and are constants.  is a 
function measuring specific characteristics of processing exports. Then the share 
of processing exports in China’s exports to country  can be expressed as 
𝑃!" = !"#!"!"!" = 𝛿𝑓(𝑧) (3). 
To evaluate equation (3), i.e. to determine the share of processing exports in 
China’s bilateral exports, we apply the model ln 𝑃!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽! ln 𝑌!" + 𝛽! ln 𝑊!" + 𝛽! ln 𝐸𝑋$! + 𝛽!𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 𝛽!𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑡 + 𝜀!" 
 (4) 
defines as follows.  
EXit i
EXit = λ
GDPctGDPit
dci
PEXit i
PEXit = γ
GDPctGDPit
dci
f (z)
GDPct GDPit i dci
i λ γ f (z)
i
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The first independent variable denotes the real per capita GDP of country . 
As argued above, processing exports mainly target the markets of high-income 
countries, where consumer preference for brand and high-tech products is much 
stronger than in low-income countries. Xing (2016) shows that among China’s 
trading partners there is a significant log-linear relation between the share of 
processing exports and GDP per capita.   represents the wage of Chinese 
workers. EAD is a dummy variable equal to one when the trading partners are 
from East Asian countries. Chinese firms are deeply involved in regional value 
chains established by Japanese and Korean multinational enterprises. China’s 
processing exports show significant regional bias towards East Asia. A 
substantial portion of processing exports is intermediate inputs supplied to firms 
in other East Asian economies (Xing, 2012), so it is necessary to control the 
regional bias of value chains involving Chinese firms. In addition, we introduce 
the dummy variable 𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑡  to identify import countries that are entrepots, i.e. 
countries through which Chinese exports are shipped to third countries. Entrepots 
here include Hong Kong, Macao and Luxembourg.  is the nominal yuan-US 
dollar exchange rate. Exchange rate is a standard independent variable included 
in all models of exports. Exchange rates affect processing exports mainly through 
the channel of firms’ points of entry and exit, not through conventional price 
mechanisms. The exit of firms specializing in processing exports gives rise to 
changes in export structure. Since the dependent variable is defined as the ratio 
of processing exports to total exports, if the coefficient of is significantly 
different from zero, exchange rates have a much stronger effect on processing 
exports than on ordinary exports.  
We estimate model (4) separately for PAE, MAE and total processing exports, 
using data collected from various sources. Bilateral PAE, MAE, processing 
exports and total exports data were provided by China Customs. Wage and 
exchange rate data were retrieved from China Statistics Yearbooks. GDP per 
capita data for China’s trading partners was downloaded from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. The descriptive statistics indicate that 
the export share of PAE fell much faster than that of MAE.  This suggests that 
wage shifts and the appreciation of the yuan affect PAE more than MAE. We 
Yit i
WCt
EX$t
EX$t
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estimate the model using both the ordinary least squared (OLS) model and the 
fixed effect model. Results of the unit root test suggest that the independent 
variable is stationary for all three cases, PAE, MAE and total processing exports. 
We used two different settings for proxy Wct: the average annual wage for all 
sectors and the average annual manufacturing salary 
Table 1: Wages, Exchange Rates and Mixed Assembly Exports 
Independent	  
Variables	   OLS	  Estimates	  	   Fixed	  Effect	  	  
lnY	  
0.272***	  
(0.00785)	  
0.272***	  
(0.00785)	  
0.706***	  
(0.106)	  
0.726***	  
(0.107)	  
lnW	  
0.000550	  
(0.0227)	   	  
-­‐0.0739***	  
(0.0253)	   	  
lnEX	  
0.427***	  
(0.146)	  
0.411***	  
(0.151)	  
0.458***	  
(0.121)	  
0.422***	  
(0.126)	  
EAD	  
0.417***	  
(0.0278)	  
0.417***	  
(0.0279)	   	   	  
Entrepot	  
0.153***	  
(0.0550)	  
0.153***	  
(0.0551)	   	   	  
lnMW	   	  
-­‐0.00405	  
(0.0248)	   	  
-­‐0.0897***	  
(0.0277)	  
Constant	  
-­‐4.900***	  
(0.410)	  
-­‐4.844***	  
(0.428)	  
-­‐8.098***	  
(0.867)	  
-­‐8.119***	  
(0.861)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Observations	   2,401	   2,401	   2,401	   2,401	  
R-­‐squared	   0.352	   0.352	   0.625	   0.626	  
 Source: the author’s calculations 
 
Table 1-3 summarizes the estimation results. The estimates of OLS for each 
category of processing exports are listed for comparison  The following analysis 
is based on the results of the fixed effect model with manufacturing wages. Table 
1 summarizes the estimates of MAE. The coefficient of income is 0.726, 
statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that the income level of China’s trading 
partners is positively correlated with the intensity of MAE. The estimated 
coefficient suggests that a 1% increase in the income of the trading partners 
would result in a 2.1 percentage points increase in the share of MAE, indicating 
that MAE mainly target the markets of high-income countries. The estimated 
coefficient of exchange rates is 0.422, also statistically significant at 1%.  
Because exchange rate  is defined as the price of the US dollar in yuan, the EX
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positive coefficient implies that the depreciation of the yuan would give rise to an 
increase in the intensity of MAE. Specifically, a 1% nominal depreciation of the 
yuan is expected to lift the share of MAE by 1.5 percentage points.  Conversely, a 
1% appreciation of the yuan would reduce the share of MAE by 1.5 percentage 
points. Given that the Chinese yuan has appreciated nominally against the US 
dollar by more than 35% since 2005, the declining share of MAE in both China’s 
aggregate and bilateral exports can be attributed in part to the cumulative 
appreciation of the yuan. The coefficient of wages is -0.0897, statistically 
significant at 1%. The negative coefficient is consistent with our hypothesis that 
wage increases have gradually eroded China’s competitiveness in processing 
exports and triggered the exit of both domestic and foreign firms from the 
assembly business. The coefficient suggests that a 1% increase in manufacturing 
wages would reduce the share of MAE by 1.1 percentage points. Since 2000 the 
average wage in China has risen by more than 13% each year, which suggests 
that cumulative increase in wages is one of the major factors driving the change 
in the structure of China’s exports and mitigating China’s dependence on 
processing exports. 
Table 2: Wages, Exchange Rates and Pure Assembly Exports 
Independent	  
Variables	   OLS	  Estimates	  	   Fixed	  Effect	  	  
lnY	  
0.524***	  
(0.0155)	  
0.524***	  
(0.0155)	  
0.506***	  
(0.193)	  
0.541***	  	  
(0.192)	  
lnW	  
-­‐0.431***	  
(0.0431)	   	  
-­‐0.403***	  
(0.0498)	   	  
lnEX	  
0.933***	  
(0.287)	  
0.782***	  
(0.295)	  
1.001***	  
(0.233)	  
0.856***	  
(0.243)	  
EAD	  
1.582***	  
(0.0576)	  
1.582***	  
(0.0575)	   	   	  
Entrepot	  
-­‐0.436***	  
(0.112)	  
-­‐0.436***	  
(0.112)	   	   	  
lnMW	   	  
-­‐0.482***	  
(0.0473)	   	  
-­‐0.459***	  
(0.0544)	  
Constant	  
-­‐7.805***	  
(0.797)	  
-­‐7.284***	  
(0.831)	  
-­‐7.841***	  
(1.470)	  
-­‐7.594***	  
(1.448)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Observations	   2,401	   2,401	   2,401	   2,401	  
R-­‐squared	   0.430	   0.431	   0.717	   0.718	  
 Source: the author’s calculations 
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Table 2 reports the results of estimation for PAE, which are consistent with 
those for MAE. Specifically, all estimated PAE coefficients have the same 
signs and the same level of statistical significance as those of MAE, though the 
numerical values differ and the numerical differences are not trivial. The 
estimated coefficients of income, exchange rates and wages are 0.541, 0.856 
and -0.459 respectively. We can say unequivocally that the impacts of 
exchange rates and wages on PAE are much higher than on MAE. To illustrate 
the differences, we calculate the expected impact of a 1% increase in each of 
income, exchange rate and wages on MAE and PAE. The results are shown in 
Figure 5.  
Figure 5. The Impacts of a 1% increase in wages, exchange rate and income 
 
Source: the author’s calculations 
While the effect of income on MAE is stronger than that on PAE, exchange 
rates and wages have a stronger influence on PAE.  Specifically, a 1% 
increase in wages would be expected to result in a 1.6 percentage point 
decrease in the export share of PAE, 0.5 percentage points greater than for 
MAE; and a 1% nominal appreciation of the yuan against the US dollar would 
lower the share of PAE by 2.4 percentage points, 0.3 percentage points more 
than for MAE. These differences indicate that PAE is affected more strongly by 
wage increases and currency appreciation than MAE. Foreign suppliers 
provide all parts and components for the manufacture of PAE. Assembly fees, 
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generally denominated in US dollars, are the only source of profit for PAE firms. 
Wages are the primary determinant of the profit margins. Aside from 
productivity improvement, PAE firms have essentially no other means of 
absorbing the costs of wage increases and currency appreciation. On the other 
hand, firms engaging in MAE can absorb cost increases, either by lowering the 
cost of internally manufactured parts or by passing those increases on to the 
domestic suppliers of parts and components. Therefore, faced with the same 
level of wage increase or currency appreciation, PAE firms are more likely to 
exit the assembly business than MAE firms. This explains why wages and 
exchange rates have a stronger effect on PAE than on MAE.  
Table 3 shows estimates of total processing exports from China. Those results 
are consistent with the estimates for PAE and MAE. Total processing exports 
comprise PAE and MAE, so it is not surprising that the statistical inferences 
regarding total processing exports are similar to those for PAE and MAE. The 
estimate of total processing exports lends further support for the conclusions 
derived from the estimates of PAE and MAE. 
 Table 3:  Wages, Exchange Rates and Processing Exports 
Independent	  
Variables	   OLS	  Estimates	  	   Fixed	  Effect	  	  
lnY	  
0.299***	  
(0.00777)	  
0.299***	  
(0.00777)	  
0.696***	  
(0.0994)	  
0.718***	  
(0.0997)	  
lnW	  
-­‐0.0690***	  
(0.0221)	   	  
-­‐0.137***	  
(0.0239)	   	  
lnEX	  
0.372**	  
(0.146)	  
0.336**	  
(0.151)	  
0.405***	  
(0.114)	  
0.349***	  
(0.118)	  
EAD	  
0.539***	  
(0.0274)	  
0.539***	  
(0.0274)	   	   	  
Entrepot	  
0.123**	  
(0.0499)	  
0.123**	  
(0.0499)	   	   	  
lnMW	   	  
-­‐0.0809***	  
(0.0243)	   	  
-­‐0.159***	  
(0.0262)	  
Constant	  
-­‐4.442***	  
(0.406)	  
-­‐4.313***	  
(0.425)	  
-­‐7.373***	  
(0.800)	  
-­‐7.335***	  
(0.793)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Observations	   2,401	   2,401	   2,401	   2,401	  
R-­‐squared	   0.434	   0.434	   0.722	   0.722	  
Source: the author’s calculations	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5. Concluding Remarks 
The fall of China’s export growth is not only the result of sluggish external 
demand, but also of substantial shrinkage of processing export capacity. 
Persistent wage increases and cumulative appreciation of the yuan are the two 
major factors compelling both domestic and foreign firms to exit the assembly 
business. This exit in turn undercuts China’s export capacity and reduces its 
growth momentum. The conventional literature identifies price mechanisms as 
the main channel by which wages and exchange rates affect exports. It is 
argued here that in the case of processing exports (a subset of GVC activity), 
price mechanisms are not a major channel through which wages and 
exchange rates can exert an impact, because the manufacturers of assembled 
exports have little pricing power. Rather, wages and exchange rates affect 
firms’ entry into and exit from the assembly business.  Instead of estimating 
exchange rate elasticity, this study examines the extent to which wage and 
exchange rates have impacted China’s export structure, defined as a 
composite of OE, PAE and MAE.    
The empirical analysis presented here demonstrates that wage increases and 
the appreciation of the yuan have significantly reduced the intensity of both 
PAE and MAE in China’s bilateral trade, thus undermining the growth of 
aggregate exports. The data analyzed were derived from panel data covering 
China’s bilateral PAE and MAE with its major trading partners during the period 
1991-2013. The analysis affords a supply side explanation for China’s dramatic 
fall in export growth to -2.8% from 20% five years earlier. Processing exports, 
which accounted for more than 55% of China’s total exports during the high 
growth period, fell to 39% in 2013. Our empirical results suggest that the 
contraction of processing exports is primarily the result of wage increases and 
the cumulative appreciation of the yuan, and that declining processing export 
production capacity played a far more important role than weakened external 
demand in undermining the growth of exports.  
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